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PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH 
This article examines the patterns of economic growth in Russia. It demonstrates that while the discus-
sions focus on the problems of the short-term growth and the incentives therefor, the growth problems 
are more important in the long-term perspective. The article evaluates the future growth potential of 
Russia under various assumptions within the framework of standard methods of economic growth 
prediction. If the current tendencies persist, the next two decades will show a considerably lower 
growth of the gdP of Russia than within the previous 15 years, due primarily to the sharp decrease 
in the availability of labor. Besides, the better part of the potential for the increase in productivity is 
already exhausted. The growth of the gdP of Russia will stay below two percent per annum. Refs 25. 
figs 6. Table 1.
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ПРОБЛЕМЫ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ РОСТА РОССИЙСКОЙ ЭКОНОМИКИ
в статье рассматриваются особенности экономического роста в России. Показано, что в то 
время как текущие дискуссии сосредоточены на проблемах краткосрочного роста и его стиму-
лирования, более важными являются проблемы роста в долгосрочной перспективе. в работе 
приведена оценка потенциала будущего роста России в рамках стандартных методов прогно-
зирования экономического роста при различных предположениях. Если нынешние тенденции 
сохранятся, то в ближайшие два десятилетия темпы прироста ввП России будут значительно 
ниже, чем в предыдущие 15 лет, составляя менее двух процентов годовых, что в первую очередь 
связано с резким снижением доступности рабочей силы. кроме того, большая часть потенциа-
ла для повышения производительности труда уже исчерпана. Библиогр. 25 назв. Ил. 6. табл. 1.
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изводительность, демография. 
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Introduction 
Within the period between the two crises of 1998 and 2008, Russian economy re-
corded high rates of growth. The current recession followed the period of damping dy-
namic, the stagnation began even before the dramatic drop in the oil prices or the ag-
gravation of the geopolitical situa-tion. The final adaptation of the economy to the new 
operational conditions (low prices for hydro-carbons, limited access to the global finan-
cial markets and new technologies) does not signify an immediate transition to the new 
wave of growth. at the same time, it is possible to estimate its potential rates in view of the 
available resources — cash funds and the availability of labor, as well as the change of the 
total factor productivity. The able-bodied population in Russia continues to decrease in a 
significant way, the fixed capital investments are still low and the future productivity dy-
namics remain uncertain. If these tendencies persist, the Russian growth potential — even 
in the most optimistic scenarios — is between 1–2 percent during the next two decades. It 
is lower than the predicted growth rates of the global economy, and will cause the decrease 
of the Russia’s relative share in the global economy. 
1. The change of the growth characteristics of the Russian economy 
from 1999 to 2016, the Russian economy has finished two business cycles and is pres-
ently close to the beginning of the third. as obvious from the graph, the average annual 
growth rate for the period from 2000 to 2008 was 7.3%, from 2010 to 2014 — 3.5%.
1.1. Growth of Russian economy, 1999–2009.  
The favorable factors of accelerated growth 
The nine years following the crisis of 1998 showed the highest rates in the post-Soviet 
his-tory. The reason therefor lies in a series of simultaneous favorable factors character-
istic for that specific period, which fully or partially ceased to exist within the next cycle. 
The crisis resulted in the lowering of relative costs and the increase of the price com-
petitive-ness of the Russian-based production on the domestic market. The devaluation 
of ruble erected a protectionist barrier against import and lead to the expanded demand 
for domestic goods, and in the same time, the export taxes introduced in that period 
limited the growth of prices for the raw materials and electricity for the manufacturing 
industry. The jump in prices of the autumn of 1998 lead to the lowering of real wages and, 
consequently, to the lowering of costs, by the end of the crisis the unemployment reached 
its maximal rate in the recorded history — 13.2% [labour and employment in Russia, 
2001, p. 162]. large number of unemployed, who had lost neither their expertise, nor their 
working skills, created the conditions for the future output expansion. 
By the moment of recovery, the economy possessed the reserves of productive capac-
ity. The catastrophic drop of the output in the previous decade, despite the inequality of 
loss among the different sectors, created a considerable mass of underutilized equipment, 
which in conjunction with the excess of labor, cheap raw materials and the growing do-
mestic demand created the favor-able conditions for the start of growth even in view of 
limited amount of net investments. 
another important circumstance was a well-balanced macro-economic policy of the 
government, carried out at that time. Budget austerity and the implementation of the 
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conditions of the newly adopted Budget Code lead to the gradual decrease of the inflation 
rate and ultimately to the financial recovery. 
The economic growth was supported by the improvement of the economic situation 
in the global primary commodity markets, first of all, the energy markets. The average 
Brent price in the period from december 1997 through July 1999 constituted 12.6 USd 
per barrel, from august 1999 to april 2004 — 25.5 USd per barrel. Starting with april 
2004 and until august 2008, the average monthly growth rate of the Brent prices was 2.6%. 
The prices of metals and other raw materials showed slower, yet also considerable growth. 
as a result, output growth within the export-orientated extractive industry happened at 
a quicker rate compared to that of the domestically orientated manufacturing industries, 
from which the whole growth-process had originally started. 
The increase of employment and utilization of idle capacity into the production was 
accompanied by investments into new capacity technologies within the industries with 
the steadily growing demand, both export-orientated and targeting the domestic market. 
furthermore, service sector grew vigorously. as a result, growth in total factor productiv-
ity (TfP) became an important component of the economic growth. different economists 
give roughly similar estimates of the contribution of the total factor productivity into the 
Figure 1. Russian GDP growth, 2000–2016, percent of corresponding period of previous year.  
Source:Rosstat.URL: 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/accounts/#(accessed: 
14.12.2016).
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Figure 1. Russian gdP growth, 2000–2016, percent of corresponding period of previous year
S o u r c e: Rosstat. URl: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/accounts/ (ac-
cessed: 14.12.2016).
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growth rate within this period. for instance, Voskoboynikov and Solanko (2014) think 
that within the period from 1995 to 2008 it grew by 2.5% per annum. kuboniwa (2011) es-
timates TfP growth at 2.6% per annum in the period from 1995 to 2010. drobyshevs-
kiy and Sinelnikov–Murylev (2015), who evaluated the TfP for the period from 1999 to 
2008 with according to the OECd method as the difference between actual gdP growth 
rate and its calculated value based on the actual data on labor and capital costs, revealed 
that the growth rate of TfP varied from 2.4% in 2002 to 6% in 2006.
The global crisis of 2008–2009 manifested itself in the Russian economy starting with 
the 4th quarter of 2008, when a series of interconnected events (the drop in oil prices, high 
external debts of the corporate sector, drastic increase in interest rate) lead to the decrease 
of the output: if in the 3rd quarter the growth had still constituted 6.4% of corresponding 
period of previous year, in the 4th one the economy was already declining at the rate of 
–1.3%. 
1.2. The dampening growth within the 2010–2016 cycle.  
Transition from stagnation into recession
The period of post-crisis recovery did not lead to the restoration of the former growth 
rate. Moreover, though the prices for hydrocarbons rebounded (from March 2011  to 
august 2014 price of Brent crude oil didn’t go below 100 USd per barrel, with the average 
for the period of about 110 USd per barrel), starting from 2010 the output growth steadily 
decelerated, reaching 0.6% by 2014. The Russian economy underwent the transition to 
stagnation despite the positive situation in the primary commodity markets and no 
serious geopolitical problems; namely, none of those circumstances to which people tend 
to attribute the current depression. 
There are many explanations for the transition of the Russian economy from the 
high growth rate into stagnation, each of which presents its own considerably differing 
remedies for the current situation. 
1.2.1. The decrease of the pace of investment growth 
The slackening of this pace is connected to the investment pause that occurred as 
a result of the completion of a series of major projects (ESPO pipeline, Sochi Olympics, 
aPEC summit) and lack of new causes for the extensive investments by public sector it-
self and the state-controlled corporations [Ivanter, 2015]. Excessive government control 
hampers development of the private sector, and at the same time, public sector does not 
solve the major tasks of investment in the infrastructure, which leads to the slackening of 
the economic growth [grinberg, 2014]. Consequently, the decrease of growth rate is of 
a “technical” nature and might be gradually overcome with restoration of the volume of 
investments by the public sector. The peculiarity of the “procyclical” behavior of the Rus-
sian budgetary investment leads to the situation, where their decrease occurs exactly at 
the times of the economic slowdowns, further lowering the already decreasing demand. 
On the other hand, the budgetary reflation in the situation of the decline in tax reve-
nue and the budget deficit may lead to the breach of financial stability, build-up of the pub-
lic debt and inflation. accordingly, Idrisov and Sinelnikov-Murylev [2015] fear that by the 
using the fiscal policy for the purposes of short-term stimulation of the economic growth 
the Russian economy may slide into stagflation. Uluykaev and Mau [2015] also mention 
the limited potency of this measure for the short-term stimulation of the economy in the 
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face of the unsolved structural problems. They also argue that under the current conditions 
attempts to artificially promote growth may lead to wasting long-term growth perspectives 
and to stagflation. Increase in the budgetary investments in the current situation entails 
either growing deficit with unpredictable inflation con-sequences, or increase in the tax 
burden, with the following decrease of the investments on the part of the private sector. 
On the other hand, the decrease of the investments undoubtedly lies at the heart of 
the stag-nation in the Russian economy. The lowering of the growth rate of real invest-
ments, which grad-ually slipped into actual decrease, started since 2011. The process has 
an almost linear character, which is apparent in fig. 2. Rate of the decrease of fixed invest-
ments on the average is –4.2% per annum. By 2015, ratio of the fixed capital investment to 
the gdP had sunk to 18.9%. 
–8
–6
–4
–2
 0
 2
 4
6
8
10
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015G
ro
w
th
, %
Years
fixed capital formation GDP
Figure 2. gdP growth and fixed capital formation growth (at constant prices; annual %), 2011–2015
S o u r c e: Rosstat. URl: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/accounts/ (acces-
sed: 17.07.2016).
The contribution of the fixed capital investments had been low since the beginning 
of the global financial crisis, between 20.2% and 22% of the gdP. If for the developed 
countries such as the U. S. a., great Britain, or denmark, the low investment contribution 
in the gdP does not present a problem, for Russia it is a serious growth constraint. In this 
terms Russia ranks below 95 countries out of 147, for which we have the data for 2014, and 
especially below countries like China, India, the Czech Republic, Romania etc.) (fig. 3). 
In 2014 average gdP per capita of the countries with lower than in Russia invest-
ment contribution to the gdP constitutes 18,800 USd and their average rate of economic 
growth is 2.2%; for the countries with higher investment contribution to the gdP the cor-
responding values are 13,800 USd and 3.9%.
It is impossible to explain such an extensive process of the investment contraction 
by the decrease of the investments from the public sector, even given the considerable 
share of the state-controlled corporations in the Russian economy. Within the period in 
question, the contribution of budgetary funds into the fixed capital investments barely 
fluctuated and notably decreased only in 2015. Moreover, if the formation procedure for 
the program of the budgetary investment expenditures may be influenced by other con-
siderations besides the economic logic, the decisions of corporations, whoever were their 
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controlling shareholders, to a considerable degree depend on an anticipated yield from an 
investment projects and its risks. Obviously the combination of expected returns and risks 
has not been conducive for investments.
among the factors explaining the reduction of investment in gdP is a substantial 
decrease in foreign direct investments (fdIs). This decrease derived from both econom-
ic processes themselves and increasing tensions between Russia and developed nations. 
declining output, reduction of the inflow of currency earnings due to a bad state of the 
markets of hydrocarbons, and dropping real earnings of the population all formed an un-
favourable environment for the arrival of foreign investors or expansion of their presence. 
In 2009, with a rather favourable foreign policy environment, the inflow of fdI into the 
Russian economy plunged more than twice, from USd 74.78 billion before the crisis in 
2008 to USd 36.58 billion. The post-crisis fdI recovery to USd 69.22 billion in 2013 was 
followed by a new dramatic fall down to USd 22 billion in 2014 and USd 6.48 billion in 
2015. Such a drastic reduction in the investment inflow into Russia is obviously caused not 
so much by economic as by geopolitical reasons. The capital was withdrawn through merg-
ers and acquisitions (– USd 10.8 billion in 2014 and — USd 11.0 billion in 2015) as well as 
through the outflow of funds via debt instruments (–USd 1.07 billion in 2014 and — USd 
3.87 billion in 2015). apart from direct macroeconomic consequences, the reduction of 
fdI inflow leads to a limited availability of modern technologies coupled with a decreased 
potential for the growth of labour productivity in the medium and long run. apparently 
fdI can recover only providing that the relations are normalised and sanctions in the 
financial sector are lifted.
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1.2.2. Interest rates and money deficit. Is the monetary expansion necessary? 
The slowing of the economic growth rate and the gradual transition to the stagna-
tion can be explained by the mistakes in the existing economic and especially monetary 
policies. The limited money supply and the lowering of the aggregate demand causes the 
decline of the growth rate down to the stagnation of 2014. low level of money saturation 
in the Russian economy and high interest rates leads to the decrease of the demand on 
the part of business and households and cause the dampening of the economic growth 
[Ershov, 2015]. The attempt to control the inflation through the money supply leads to 
the situation, where the interest rates for the real sector exceed the output profitability for 
all industries, except for the extracting, chemical and metallurgical industries [glazyev, 
2014]. The auster monetary policy leads to the tightening of the credit conditions and 
the lowering of the non-financial sector’s share within the credit portfolio of the banking 
system [altunyan, 2015]. 
The increase in the money supply within the period of the quick economic growth of 
the 2000s was a result of the influx of currency due to the favorable tone of the oil market 
and the Bank of Russia’s policy of exchange rate targeting. In the next cycle, the situation 
has changed. The October 2011 marks the cease of growth of the international reserves, 
and in January 2014 they start to diminish, this being said, the share of the international 
reserves in the assets of the Bank of Russia has been falling since 2011 (fig. 4). Conse-
quently, the same period marks the change in the source of the emission of rubles, the 
growth of the contribution of the credits to the banking system in the assets of the Central 
Bank, and the lowering rates of money supply. The transition to the new model of securing 
the money supply causes the Central Bank to only cautiously increase the stock of money, 
fearing the accelerated inflation. 
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The real interest rate on the credits to the non-financial sector was calculated as the 
deflated, according to the consumer price index, interest rate on credits with period up to 
one year, which constitute 70–75% of all the credits to the non-financial sector. The nega-
tive effective interest rates of 2011 were caused by the relatively stable growth of prices in 
the situation of slowly decreasing interest rates. from december 2011 and up to the end 
of 2014  the effective interest rates were kept within the interval of 3–5%. Their abrupt 
upsurge in december 2014 was caused by the need to stop the devaluation of ruble, and 
the following decrease — by the acceleration of the inflation in view of slowly decreasing 
nominal interest rates. Presently, we can see the beginning of the new growth wave of the 
effective interest rates, since the dampening of the inflation is quicker than the decrease of 
the nominal interest rates.
The high effective interest rate on the credits to the non-financial sector limits their 
investment ability and dampens the growth, especially in comparison to the bankability of 
the competing corporations from the developed countries. at the same time, the increase 
of money supply through the credits to the banking sector raises serious concern in view 
of the unstable economic situation and the high inflation expectations. for instance, gor-
yunov et al. [2015] maintain that the main task of the Bank of Russia is the accumulation 
of the reputational capital for the shaping of the continuously low inflation expectation of 
the economic agents, and thus preserving the stability of prices despite the momentary 
shocks. In their evaluation of the monetary policy of the Bank of Russia through the ac-
tual cost of capital in the interbank market, they tend to describe it as too soft. kudrin and 
gurvich express a concern that the emission of money, while ensuring a short-term in-
crease of growth, will lead to serious long-term losses due to the acceleration of the infla-
tion, pressure on ruble, lower cost-effectiveness and the decrease of investments [kudrin 
and gurvich, 2015]. 
The reality of the current situation in the Russian economy is such that the Bank of 
Russia is the only possible source of the long-term money. The limited access to the global 
capital markets, the small capacity of the domestic bond market, the high interest rates 
and the tight conditions of the long-term credits to the real sector create the financial 
constraints for the investments, no easier to overcome than the bureaucratic problems 
or the insecurity of the rights of ownership. On the other hand, the monetary expansion 
should not lead to the overflow of the issued money into the foreign-exchange market or 
the increase of the credits to households. The mechanisms for the solution of this problem 
are already created and being used (refinancing of the credits for the in-vestment projects, 
a program of recapitalization of banks through federal loan bonds), but not on a scale 
comparable to the real sector’s demand for the cheap investment credits. Even with all the 
inherent inflation risks, using the emission for the financing of the investments remains 
one the very few available sources for the growing rate of the recovery. 
1.2.3. The fall in oil prices 
One of the short-term factors of the slowing, and presently — a decline, of the Rus-
sian economy are the oil prices. Even the stabilization of the oil prices in 2011–2014 at 
around 110 dollar per barrel, which is close to the historical maximum of 2008, was al-
ready perceived as an explanation for the slowing of the rates of economic growth. Their 
further drop provoked the crisis of 2015–2016, though even now the oil prices are far from 
the minimal values of 1998. (The current price of oil corresponds to that of 2005, when 
44 Вестник СПбГУ. Экономика. 2017. Т. 33. Вып. 1
the growth rate was 6.4% per annum). deryugina and Ponomarenko [2015] use a large 
Bayesian VaR model to assess the relative importance of various macroeconomic factors 
in explaining the short-run evolution of Russia’s gdP. They find that the oil price in com-
bination with EU demand is enough to forecast and explain most short-term variations 
in Russian gdP. according to their results, oil prices and the demand from the EU are 
sufficient for the prediction and explanation of the short-term fluctuations in the gdP of 
Russia. Rautava [2013] also notes a similar dependence on the price of oil, finds that Rus-
sia’s trend growth halved to approximately 2% after the global financial crisis. 
The income from the exported oil affects the Russian economy in a number of ways: 
from the fiscal revenue (more than 50% of the income of the federal budget before the 
sharp drop in the global oil prices); to the stability of the ruble exchange rate (as recently 
as in 2014 the hydrocarbons were responsible for up to 70% of the export earnings); to the 
investment costs of the oil and gas producers and the pipeline companies.
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Figure 5. Price of crude oil in dollars and ruble exchange rate from January 2014 to March 2016
S o u r c e: Bloomberg. URl: https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/CO1:COM (accessed: 11.06.2016). 
figure 5 shows the close relation of the exchange rate of ruble to the oil prices. de-
spite the tumultuous geopolitical events of the spring of 2014, the inclusion of the Crymea 
and Sevastopol into Russia and subsequent sanctions, the Russian currency and financial 
markets remain relatively calm, while the ruble goes into a steep decline as the oil price 
plummets. The connection is reciprocal, of course. When price of oil stabilizes and recov-
ers somewhat in february and March 2015, the ruble finds its legs. In summer 2015, when 
oil prices head down again, the ruble follows suit.
If price of oil only affected Russia’s terms of trade, a floating exchange rate would be 
effective in helping the economy adjust. In Russia’s case, however, it appears that the oil 
price is determinative of many things, including the willingness of foreign investors to 
fund projects in Russia. It seems that many Russian companies have difficulty in accessing 
global financial markets, and their foreign indebtedness is decreasing rapidly. for the pub-
lic sector, Russia’s sovereign wealth funds have provided a partial answer to this dilemma. 
during good times they mopped up budget surpluses. In the current situation, however, 
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these funds are being depleted. Obviously, Reserve fund was set for exactly this purpose: 
to cover budget sector deficits in downturns. 
The negative influence of the low oil prices on the growth of the Russian economy is 
obvious, and may be considered exogenous, something that cannot be influenced by the 
government or its policies. The problem is whether under these new conditions the Rus-
sian economy can switch from stagnation into growth, and potentially form a diversified 
structure of production, which would be both resistant towards the outside shocks and 
adaptable to new environment.
1.2.4. The manifestation of the long-term factors,  
or is there a middle income trap in Russia?
another explanation for the decrease of the growth rate of the Russian economy is the 
hypothesis that it has fallen into a “middle income trap”. Unlike the previous explanations 
of the slowing growth rate, which connected this problem with factors of the momentary, 
short-term nature, the middle income trap is caused by the long-term factors of the in-
stitutional and structural character, whichs lead into lengthy stagnation period, wherein 
the preconditions for the future growth will be slowly forming. The term “middle income 
trap” appeared first in the work of gill and kharas [2007]. 
The phenomenon of abrupt slowing after a period of quick economic growth as the 
country’s economy approaches that of the developed countries has occurred in the eco-
nomic history on multiple occasions, primarily in latin america. during the first stages 
of catching-up development, productivity can be quickly boosted by copying the existing 
models, technology transfer and low factor cost. labor transfer from the informal sectors 
of employment into the formal ones, from the low value adding industries into the more 
effective ones ensures quick growth of the total factor productivity [Voskobojnikov and 
gempel’son, 2015]. however, after a certain income level is achieved, further growth re-
quires growing investments into the education, research and development, and building-
up of the infrastructure, and thus growth rate experiences a sharp slowdown. 
The limits of the “middle income”, coming close to which is dangerous in terms of 
slowdown, considerably differ according to the different authors, which is also true for 
the choice of countries that can be considered to be in the “trap”. Eichengreen, Park and 
Shin (2012) give the following definition of the level where there is danger of falling into 
trap: 17000 gk 2005 dollars of the gdP per capita with the 23% employment in the man-
ufacturing industry, and 57% ratio of the gdP of the catching-up country to that of a 
leading country. One year after the same authors changed the limits somewhat by indi-
cating several intervals, where the danger increases: 10–11 thousand dollars at 2005 PPP 
and 15–16 thousand dollars [Eichengreen, Park and Shin, 2013]. Cross-country analysis 
showed that the probability of transition from the quickly growing economy to stagnation 
increased at those specific values of the gdP per capita.
The Russian economy had approached the limits of the middle income already by the 
end of the previous business cycle, and factors slowing the economic growth in the “mid-
dle income trap” pertain to the characteristics of its current development. loss of the low 
costs advantage and the problems with institutions ensuring the qualitative development, 
together with low diversification of the sectoral structure, left it vulnerable to outside 
shocks. already in 1993, Rodrik [1993] pointed out the diversification of the economic 
structure and the presence of the skilled, highly paid labor as the conditions of the stable 
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growth of the moderately developed economy. lack of the export diversification and the 
corresponding sectoral structure is being pointed out as the main reason for slowing of 
growth in the latin american countries [Jankowska et al., 2012]. The above-mentioned 
article by Eichengreen et al. [2013] gives the diversification of export as the main sugges-
tion for the avoidance of the “middle income trap”. “The slowing less often occurs in the 
countries, where the population has a high level of education and where the contribution 
of the high-technology products in the export is relatively high”. 
Process of economic diversification requires a sustained effort, stable investments, 
and institutional changes, creating the necessary investment environment. Currently 
some characteristics of Russian economy fall short from these prescriptions. according to 
ironic words of Mirkin [2016]: “We can positively conclude: we have escaped it [the mid-
dle income trap] and now are heading straightly to the trap of poverty”.
2. Growth in the long-term period 
In this section, we assess Russia`s growth potential for the next two decades with a 
Cobb-duglas function, writing (in logarithms) growth in gdP yt as a function of growth 
in labor supply lt and capital stock kt. In addition, an increase in total factor productivity 
at may boost economic growth by allowing more efficient ways of combining labor and 
capital (often with more advanced technology, but also “soft” infrastructure improvements 
such as organizational innovations). The labor share in total output with б and capital 
share is denoted as β1. Thus, the Cobb–duglas production function will look as follows:
  уt = at + βlt + βkt  
The able-bodied population in Russia has started to decrease. This trend, under oth-
erwise equal conditions, tacitly lowers the gdP growth. figure 6  shows the evolution 
of the structure of the able-bodied population of Russia (15–59; if the current statutory 
age of retirement of 60 years for men and 55 years for women remains unchanged) from 
1950 to 2050. We took the “medium version” of the UN prognosis for 2015–2050. 
figure 6 shows the evolution of the structure of Russia’s working age population (15–
59; Russia’s official pension age is still 60 for men and 55 for women) from 1950 to 2050. 
forecasts from 2015 to 2050 are the “medium variant” from the United Nations. While 
the accuracy of any demographic forecast decreases as the forecast horizon increases, we 
can predict the trend in the working-age population over the next 20 years quite well as 
almost all people who will be of working-age in this time have already been born. accord-
ing to the UN prediction from July 2015, Russia’s working-age population will decline 
from 90.7 million in 2015 to 78.7 million in 2035, which translates to an average change 
of –0.7% a year.
Estimating the capital stock of any country is fraught with difficulties, but these prob-
lems are accentuated in countries that underwent the transition from socialist command 
economies to market- based systems. Now that Russia is over two decades into its transi-
tion, however, there is some hope that Russia’s capital stock can be estimated with a modi-
cum of accuracy.
1 labor share of income is set to 0.65, which corresponds to Russian national accounts. The results 
were nearly identical when I also performed the same exercise with a labor share of 0.55.
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Source: United Nations. http://data.un.org (accessed: 22.04.2016).  
 
Estimating the capital stock of any country is fraught with difficulties, but these problems 
are accentuated in countries that underwent the transition from socialist command economies to 
market- based systems. Now that Russia is over two decades into its transition, however, there is 
some hope that Russia’s capital stock can be estimated with a modicum of accuracy. 
Kaitila [2015] summarizes research on Russian capital stock development and finds that estimates 
of it vary considerably. In addition, for the period 2003-2012 he finds capital stock to have increased on 
average by 3.2% per annum. He also constructs four different scenarios for Russia’s GDP growth 
between 2015 and 2030 with GDP growth rates ranging from 1.7% to 4%. 
In the following exercise, we assume that Russia’s capital stock expands by 1.5% per annum 
over the next two decades. (In an alternative "Low" scenario, I assume that the capital stock declines 
by 1% per annum for the next five years, due to Russia’s restricted access to capital markets as 
outlined in the previous section.) This is slower growth than before the global financial crisis, but still 
presupposes resumption of investment growth. 
As already mentioned above, the growth of the total factor productivity within the period of 
quick economic growth constituted about 2.5% per annum.  Russian incomes have increased and the 
country is now closer to more advanced countries in terms of productivity, it seems reasonable to expect 
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kaitila [2015] summarizes research on Russian capital stock development and finds 
that estimates of it vary considerably. In addition, for the period 2003-2012 he finds capital 
stock to have increased on average by 3.2% per annum. he also constructs four different 
scenarios for Russia’s gdP growth between 2015 and 2030 with gdP growth rates ranging 
from 1.7% to 4%.
In the following exercise, we assume that Russia’s capital stock expands by 1.5% per an-
num over the next two decades. (In an alternative “low” scenario, I assume that the capital 
stock declines by 1% per annum for the next five years, due to Russia’s restricted access to capi-
tal markets as outlined in the previous section.) This is slower growth than before the global 
financial crisis, but still presupposes resumption of investment growth.
as already mentioned above, the gr wth of the total factor productivity within the pe-
riod of quick economic growth constituted about 2.5% per annum. Russian incomes have 
increased and the country is now closer to more advanced countries in terms of produc-
tivity, it seems reasonable to expect that TfP growth will decelerate in the future. also, in 
the aforementioned studies TfP growth was found to d celerate towards the end of the data 
sample. In this exercise, however, TfP is assumed (perhaps a bit optimistically) will still grow 
by 1.5% per annum, even in the out years of 2031–2035. In the “low” scenario, TfP growth is 
significantly lower during the next five years as Russian companies are unable to invest in new 
capital, which is often a prerequisite to boosting TfP.
With these assumptions, we formulate two scenarios of Russian gdP growth. In the 
baseline scenario, current geopolitical tensions have no negative effects on Russian economy 
in 2015 and beyond. In the “low” scenario, Russia suffers from economic sanctions in 2015–
2020. from 2021 on the two scenarios are identical in their assumptions.
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Table 1а. Baseline scenario of Russian growth
Labor, % Capital, % TFP, % GNP,%
2015–2020 –1,2 1,5 2,0 1,7
2021–2025 –0,9 1,5 1,8 1,7
2026–2030 –0,2 1,5 1,6 2,0
2031–2035 –0,6 1,5 1,5 1,6
Table 1б. “Low” scenario of Russian growth
Labor, % Capital,% TFP,% GNP,%
2015–2020 –1,2 –1 1,3 0,2
2021–2025 –0,9 1,5 1,8 1,7
2026–2030 –0,2 1,5 1,6 2,0
2031–2035 –0,6 1,5 1,5 1,6
In 2035, Russia’s real gdP under the baseline scenario is almost 45% higher than it is 
now. With an initial five-year period of less favorable development under the «low» scenario, 
2035 gdP is 32% higher than now2.
Is this low or high growth? Between 2000 and 2008, Russia’s real gdP expanded ap-
proximately 75%. Thus, it is fair to say that growth will be much slower than what most 
Russians have become accustomed to. But if policymakers can dampen expectations 
about growth, it is not a priori clear that even the “low” scenario is particularly low. In 
any case, both of these scenarios imply that Russia relative contribution to global gdP is 
set to decline further. 
The increase of the economic growth rate will be possible either on the assumption that 
the international trading situation is going to improve, which will influence the model through 
the increase of the total factor productivity, or as a result of a wide range of institutional re-
forms, targeting the shaping of the conditions for investments and economic diversification. 
Reaching the 4% growth rate under the condition of the restoration of the primary commod-
ity markets back to their state in 2013 will require the 24% increase of the investment contri-
bution to the gdP and the 2.8% annual growth rate of the fixed capital investments. These 
requirements together with the task of economic diversification presuppose a sharp increase 
of the investment activity of the private sector, which in its turn involves considerable changes 
in the investment environment and the credit system.
Conclusion
Current slow-down of economic growth presents only a part of a much more urgent 
and difficult problem of the long-term growth. 
The active discussions going on now within the Russian expert community mostly 
concern themselves with the problems of the short-term growth. Whether it is practical 
to stimulate the output by the lowering of the nominal interest rate or not? how tight is 
2 The results would have been possibly more realistic, if one substituted the gdP growth rates within 
2015 and 2017 with the current data and the forecast of September 2015. In this case, in 2015 the change 
of the gdP constitutes –3.7%, with –2% for 2016 and +1% for 2017. New data on the gdP growth would 
equally influence both scenarios.
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the adopted budgetary policy and whether it is necessary to stimulate the output by the 
budgetary investments? Whatever the resulting decisions, they will influence the current 
growth rate. at the same time, some objective givens of this growth are outside the regu-
lative influence of the government, and should be included into the economic policy as 
the input restraints. Even if the current geopolitical tension were to disappear in a blink, 
the Russian economy stands to experience the relatively low growth within the next two 
decades. The lower growth rates in the nearest future may well be characteristic to the ma-
jority of the global economies, yet the slowing down in comparison to the annual growth 
rates of 2000–2008 may be something that is hard to swallow. 
The other macro-economic characteristics affecting the growth may be influenced by the 
political decisions. for instance, the rate of investment may grow as a result of the institutional 
reforms, targeting the improvement of the business environment, the access to the global capi-
tal markets, and the improved work of the banking system. 
The directions of the institutional changes are obvious and have been identified for a long 
time. Property rights protection is a prerequisite for the development of the business environ-
ment. The threat of asset withdrawal or of a deteriorating business environment especially 
strikes a blow to small and medium-sized enterprises, but, as the practice shows, even the larg-
est corporations face the need of protecting their assets. Property rights can be guaranteed only 
through an independent and an effective court system. Consistent reduction of corruption at 
all levels of government power must contribute to maintaining competition. at the same time 
real changes are minor even during a crisis, and it is not obvious how they can be accelerated. 
a long-term sustainable economic growth is impossible without a favourable institutional en-
vironment which would foster active investment and human capital accumulation. 
The increased competition will also promote the productivity. Potential improvement of 
the business environment and productivity will help Russia to diversify its economy and pos-
sibly increase the profitability of products and services. 
While the Russian expert community acknowledges the problem of the dampening of the 
long-term growth, it is still difficult to prescribe any kind of measures in this regard.
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